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Abstract 
Diasporas have been widely studied since the late 1980s, especially focusing on identity, 
reception and integration in host societies. However, research exploring the relationship 
of diasporas with their homelands and, in particular, how homelands view and think 
about their diasporas is still developing. This article explores the discursive construction 
and representation of the Kosovo Albanian Diaspora by homeland Kosovo Albanians by 
critically engaging with responses to thirteen semi-structured interviews with Kosovan 
Albanians in Kosovo. The discourse of the ‘Schatzi’ is examined as a stereotype employed 
in narratives about diasporic Kosovo Albanian identity in relation to the homeland. The 
article demonstrates that dominant discourses of ‘othering’ surrounding migration, 
identity, cultural difference and national narratives of belonging and exclusion are not 
exclusive to host country contexts – suggesting that we must explore outside the 
normative paradigms of studying diaspora within host societies.  
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Introduction 
For the first time, I knew who I was. 
For the first time, I felt as if I had 
been simultaneously exploded in 
the gaze, in the violent gaze of the 
other, and at the same time, 
recomposed as another 
(Fanon 1967: 118) 
 
Diaspora and identity studies continue to 
occupy a central role in social science 
and cultural studies discussions around 
increasingly politicised issues, such as 
nation, immigration and immigrants, 
migration, asylum, borders and exile. 
While current studies have extensively 
explored diaspora’s nostalgia for the 
homeland and relationship with the host 
society (Safran 1991; Clifford 1994; 
Cohen 2001; Tsagarousianou 2004), 
literature exploring how the homeland 
constructs the diaspora is still lacking.  
 
‘Diaspora’ is a contested and unstable 
term. As Braziel and Mannur (2003) note, 
its etymological origins are in the Greek 
term diasperien, from dia, ‘across’, and 
sperien, ‘to sow or scatter seeds’. 
However, although this meaning is fairly 
mainstream in the contemporary 
context, its use is also problematic – 
suggesting clearly demarcated geo-
graphic territories, national identity, and 
belonging and dislocation from fixed 
nation-states, territories, or countries. 
Such definitions may not allow for 
diaspora as a self-ascription or a state of 
consciousness and/or social form 
(Sökefeld 2006; Vertovec 1997), and risk 
falling within the same outdated 
paradigms that referred to ‘race’ and 
ethnicity (Sökefeld 2006; Anthias 1998; 
2001). As such, experiences of the 
diaspora/ric, outside a territoriality of 
some kind, and, moreover, the 
relationships that homelands have with 
their diaspora have largely been ignored.  
 
Kosovo and the Balkans drew much 
attention during the 1990s predom-
inantly due to the nature of the conflict 
and the ethnic cleansing that ensued. 
Studies of the Kosovo Albanian Diaspora, 
especially in the UK, have steadily 
emerged since the 1990s, but the 
number remains low and limited, mainly 
focusing on Kosovo Albanians as 
immigrants or ‘new migrants’ (Vathi 
2013). Some important work has 
emerged, which explores Kosovo 
Albanian identity and integration 
(Kostovicova and Prestreshi 2003; Vathi 
2013). However diaspora research, 
especially that originating from Kosovo, 
predominantly focuses on policy, 
remittances, homeland development and 
brain drain projects (FID 2009; USAID 
2010; UNDP 2012; Xharra and Waehlisch 
2012; KAS 2013). As Levitt and Glick 
Schiller (2004) state: 
 
Our analytical lens must necessarily 
broaden and deepen because 
migrants are often embedded in 
multi-layered, multi-sited trans-
national social fields, encompassing 
those who move and those who stay 
behind. (1003) 
 
This article shifts the focus to examine 
the cultural relations of Kosovan 
Albanian diaspora, and the meaning of 
diaspora for those who remain in the 
homeland as well as migrants 
themselves. By analysing the use of the 
subverted German word ‘Schatzi’ by 
homeland Kosovo Albanians to construct 
and constitute the Kosovo Diaspora, I 
explore how diaspora discourse is 
shaped - not only by relationships 
between the individual or community in 
the host country, but also through 
homeland discourses about diaspora.  
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Methodology 
 
This article presents findings from 
analysis of thirteen semi-structured in-
depth interviews with Kosovo Albanians 
in Kosovo. The interviews were 
conducted during fieldwork in Kosovo 
between September and October 2012 
and via Skype between January and July 
2013. Out of the thirteen interviews 
conducted, nine were with members of 
civil society – mainly those working in 
NGOs, media and philanthropic 
organisations. Two interviews were 
conducted with Ministry of Diaspora 
officials, one with a government minister, 
and one with the leader of an opposition 
party.  
 
By using a critical discourse analytical 
approach (CDA) to analyse my empirical 
data (Wodak 1997), my aim is not to 
search out what people ‘truly’ mean or 
feel, but rather, from a social 
constructivist perspective, to investigate 
how certain positions and ideas about 
Kosovan diasporic identity are 
constructed as ‘truth’ within the texts 
under analysis, and to what effect they 
may operate as discourse. (Fairclough 
1995; Coupland et al. 1999; Jørgensen 
and Phillips 2009; Wodak et al. 2009). 
The approach assumes that there is a 
material and productive dimension to 
discourse, which constitutes identities 
and social groups (Hall 1996; Wodak et 
al. 2009), and enables the creation of 
knowledge in society (Weedon 1987). 
CDA is ‘critical' in the sense that it aims 
to reveal the role of discursive practice in 
the maintenance of the social world, 
including those social relations that 
involve unequal relations of power 
(Jørgensen and Phillips 2009). In my 
analysis, therefore, I highlight the 
rhetorical and discursive strategies used 
to construct and reconstruct the 
diaspora Kosovo Albanians as ‘other’ in 
relation to time and place of migration, 
highlighting that diaspora identity 
construction is not only about looking 
back to the homeland, but also about 
the gaze of the homeland towards the 
diaspora.  
 
I conducted my interviews in relatively 
relaxed and flexible environments, which 
enabled me to deal with unanticipated 
turns in the conversation and provided 
the opportunity for feedback and 
clarification of ambiguous points. I also 
chose to employ in-depth semi-
structured interviews because I wanted 
to collect data from individuals involved 
in civil society with significant social 
capital, and who are likely to have 
influence in shaping discourses about 
diaspora. The approach also enabled me 
to explore how the meaning of Kosovan 
Albanian diasporic identity is cons-
tructed, both through relating personal 
experience and other kinds of story 
about the diaspora. As Seidman (2006) 
puts it: 
 
Stories are a way of knowing. In 
order to give the details of their 
experience a beginning, middle, 
and end, people must reflect on 
their experience. It is this process 
of selecting constitutive details of 
experience, reflecting on them, 
giving them order, and thereby 
making sense of them that makes 
telling stories a meaning-making 
experience. (7) 
 
The analysis is divided into three 
sections. The first section, entitled ‘The 
Urban and Rural Divide’, explores the 
discursive construction of the 
‘gastarbeiters’ – guest workers – and 
political exiles. This is followed by 
analysis of the discursive construction 
and representation of the Kosovo 
Albanians from Germany, Switzerland, 
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Austria and the Nordic countries as 
‘Schatzi’. This word stems from a 
subversion of the German word Schatz, 
which literally translates into English as 
‘treasure’. The word is used in German 
slang as the equivalent of the English 
words sweetheart or darling. However, in 
Kosovo ‘Schatzi’ carries a very specific 
connotation, around which a stereo-
typical discourse is articulated about the 
Kosovo Diaspora as a particular social, 
cultural and economic group. In the final 
section, a range of issues and 
perceptions about diaspora returning to 
Kosovo is explored, especially with 
respect to how they are strongly 
associated with financial investments 
and remittances to Kosovo.  
 
 
Urban and Rural Divide 
 
It is widely estimated that between one-
in-three and one-in-four Kosovo 
Albanians lives outside Kosovo in what 
the Kosovo Albanians refer to as the 
‘diaspora’ (Forum 2015 2007; FID 2009; 
UNDP 2010; World Bank 2011; European 
Commission 2012). In the Albanian 
language the word ‘diaspora’ is 
synonymous with what in English would 
be translated as ‘outside’ or ‘abroad’. 
However, if approximately one-in-three 
Kosovo Albanians live in the diaspora – 
‘outside’ or ‘abroad’ – it is very likely that 
every family in Kosovo has someone 
living in diaspora. As Avtar Brah notes, 
diaspora is ‘inhabited’ ‘not only by those 
who have migrated and their 
descendants but equally by those who 
are constructed and represented as 
indigenous’ (Brah 1996: 181). Therefore, 
it is important to engage those who have 
not migrated – the indigenous - in order 
to explore how they imagine, perceive 
and construct those who did. 
 
The periods of migration from Kosovo 
can be historically traced and divided 
into four distinct phases: those who 
migrated from the 1940s to the 1960s 
due to the brutal Aleksandar Ranković 
security policy (Bieber and Daskalovski 
2003; Blumi 2003), those who migrated 
from 1963 to the end of the 1970s 
(Bernhard 2012), and those who started 
to migrate from the 1980s to the early 
1990s - before visas were introduced by 
western countries for Yugoslav nationals 
(although illegal migration continued), 
and finally between 1998 and 1999 
during the Kosovo War (Kostovicova and 
Prestreshi 2003). 
 
Historically, Kosovo has had a very 
distinct urban/rural divide (Blumi 2002; 
UNDP 2004). Throughout Yugoslavia, 
those who were well-educated and 
residing in the cities looked down on the 
agricultural and uneducated rural 
population, and Kosovo is no exception 
(Allcock 2002). It has been common to 
hear references to those from the city as 
‘Qytetar’, implying that they were an elite 
class, and to the ‘Katundar’ or ‘Katunart’, 
meaning those from the villages, 
implying a backward, rough and 
uneducated person (or simply the 
equivalent of a ‘hick’). This discriminatory 
discourse has existed despite cons-
iderable mixing of individuals and 
families, particularly amongst those 
settling in the capital, Prishtina. It is 
important to draw attention to these 
stereotypes because the diaspora of 
Kosovo is composed of populations from 
a mixture of both urban and rural areas, 
cities and villages. 
 
From the interview data, it is evident that 
destination matters in how these 
stereotypes play out in the homeland 
discourse surrounding Kosovan Albanian 
diaspora. Respondents clearly imagine 
those who migrated to Germany, Austria, 
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Switzerland and the Nordic countries as 
predominantly rural, unskilled workers, 
whereas in contrast, those who migrated 
to the UK are thought of as urban city 
dwellers, who were already well-
educated before they migrated and who 
migrated due to political persecution, 
rather than for economic reasons. 
Moreover, in comparison to those 
‘thinking’, ‘intellectual’ elites who were 
persecuted by the system and regime 
and had no choice but to leave, there is 
a suggestion that migrating for economic 
reasons is negative and a personal 
individual choice. 
 
It is well documented that migration 
from the areas of the Former Republic of 
Yugoslavia to Western Europe increased 
during the 1990s as each one of the six 
republics and then the autonomous 
province of Kosovo resisted the Milosevic 
regime, which led to apartheid, ethnic 
cleansing and genocide (Sofos 1996; 
Malcolm 1998; HRW 2001; Tatum 2010; 
Booth 2012). However, migration from 
Kosovo to Western Europe started before 
the 1990s. In 1963 Yugoslavia legalised 
the emigration of its unemployed 
nationals and they were free to leave the 
country and find work as ‘gastartbeiters’ 
– guest workers – in Western Europe, 
predominantly in Germany, Switzerland, 
Austria, Sweden and France (Bernard 
2012). The total number of those who 
emigrated from the former Yugoslavia as 
guest workers during the 1960s and 
1970s is deemed to have been around 
1.3 million, with the participation of 
Kosovo estimated to be quite small 
(Bernhard 2012). The extent to which 
‘gastarbeiters’ are distinguished from 
asylum-seeking Kosovo Albanians in the 
construction of the ‘schatzi’ discourse is 
one question that this article will 
address.  
 
During the interviews I asked the 
interviewees what they thought about the 
Kosovo Albanian diaspora. The answers 
were complex, usually beginning with a 
narrative that involved stance-taking, and 
the use of rhetorical and other discursive 
devices to position the diaspora in 
relation to the homeland, and into 
specific times and historical periods of 
migration. The interviewees also provided 
specific reasons they believed caused 
these migrations (either economic, 
political or a mixture of both) and 
identified specific places they assumed 
that certain socio-economic groups 
migrated to. The first group of migrants 
forming this imagined diaspora were 
constructed as economic migrants who 
emigrated to find employment in the 
West as guest workers or ‘gastarbeiters’; 
the second, those who were fleeing 
political persecution during the late 
1980s and 1990s; the third, the refugees 
who left during the NATO intervention in 
the 1999 war.  
 
The interviewees began describing the 
diaspora by providing historical 
narratives of migration, which in most 
cases began with explaining the 
migration of guest workers, or more 
generally talking about economic 
migrants from the 1960s. Indeed, there 
was a disproportionate level of emphasis 
on describing the diaspora who migrated 
to Germany, Switzerland, Austria and the 
Nordic countries as ‘gastarbeiters’. Other 
periods of migration, for example, to 
places such as Turkey during the 
Rankovic years, 1946-1966, were largely 
ignored. Distinct periods of migration 
linked with common destinations were 
referred to with apparent ease, 
suggesting that this knowledge is drawn 
from a common national historical 
narrative, or a ‘regime of truth’ in the 
Foucauldian sense. This was generally 
followed by differentiation and 
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classification of those time and 
destination specific migrant groups, with 
examples of perceived reasons and 
routes of migration. For example, in 
response to my question ‘how do you 
think that the diaspora is viewed by 
Kosovar society’, the interviewee KG 
begins by recalling this narrative of 
diaspora 
 
KG: So as you know our Diaspora, 
we have the first wave of migrants 
from Kosovo were in the mid 
sixties, with the German 
immigration program gastarbeiters 
and basically this is the level of 
society that was unemployed 
during communism which was 
something very very uncommon to 
be unemployed during comm-
unism that managed to get these 
jobs and establish the first 
communities of Kosovo Albanians 
in in Germany and so on […]. 
 
By beginning with ‘as you know’, KG 
suggests that this is a well-known 
phenomenon, the understanding of 
which is socially shared (although, in the 
case of KG’s statement, it could also 
imply that this is knowledge shared 
amongst those who are involved in study 
or work on the diaspora). As Homi 
Bhabha (1983) states in relation to 
colonial discourse, it could be argued 
that the classification of the diaspora 
into three distinct migrant groups relies 
on the concept of ‘fixity’, since a 
discursive construction reliant on 
difference as well as rigidity is present in 
the language and narrative of homeland 
Kosovo Albanians. This includes the use 
of stereotypes to indicate taken-for-
granted meaning that cannot be proved, 
but which is presented as ‘in place’ and 
‘already known’. How this stereotype 
operates can be found both in subtle 
linguistic features of KG’s statement, and 
also in more explicit presuppositions. For 
example, KG uses the term ‘our 
diaspora’, which functions to position the 
diaspora in relation to Kosovo, 
constructing it both as a possession 
belonging to Kosovans, and – with an 
implied power relation, favouring 
homeland Kosovo – an entity that is 
separate from Kosovo. KG also suggests 
that those who left to work as guest 
workers were somehow incapable of 
getting jobs in what he represented as a 
good economic climate in communist 
Yugoslavia where almost everyone was 
employed. In fact, at the time of the 
legalisation of migration to Western 
Europe, Yugoslavia was going through a 
recession; there was high unemployment 
and a hard currency crisis (Batović 2009; 
Bernhard 2012). By the end of the 1970s 
Yugoslavia was attempting to bring back 
those migrants and developed policies of 
return. However, due to the constant 
persecution of Kosovo Albanians during 
this period, and the common 
persecution of those who returned from 
the West in former Yugoslavia (returning 
migrants suspected by the security 
services for holding democratic ideas not 
in tune with the communist ideology of 
the time could be punished with 
imprisonment), it is possible that some 
did not return and instead became 
political asylum seekers – a possibility 
ignored by KG. 
 
KG: The second generation is the 
one of migrants during the nineties 
basically between nineteen-ninety 
and nineteen-ninety-five and then 
the third generation is the one of 
the war refugees of nineteen-
ninety-nine […]  
 
Although KG in his account provides a 
very clear description as he attempts to 
define the diaspora, he subsequently 
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states that this is difficult because it is 
now a mixture of many groups: 
 
KG: So it’s very difficult to define 
Kosova diaspora right now, even if 
we focus on one particular country 
or one particular region because it 
its consisted of three different 
generations of migrants who now 
have a hybrid community 
established and it’s really difficult 
to draw any kind of general 
conclusions. 
 
However, this complexity, according to 
him, is due to ‘three different generations 
of migrants’, rather than, for example, 
being a result of their complex diversity 
in terms of age, gender, geographic and 
socio-economic background within 
Kosovo and many varied places of 
destination as migrants. By structuring 
his account of the diaspora around the 
idea of ‘three different generations’, it is 
privileged, legitimised and further ‘fixed’. 
As such, any pre-existing hybridity of the 
diasporic group is obfuscated, hybridity 
instead being apparently born out of 
subsequent developments of the 
diaspora in host societies ‘who now have 
a hybrid community established’.  
 
The idea that KG’s response taps into an 
already fixed stereotypical, ideological 
and historical framework through which 
the diaspora are seen is further 
supported by the account of another 
interviewee, HA. Opening with the 
statement that there are ‘phases of when 
the diaspora is made’, his narrative also 
reifies the temporal, or generational 
grouping of migrants. The two main 
motivations for migration he suggests, 
economic and political, are later 
amalgamated due to the Milosevic 
regime: 
 
HA: […] the key is to I think, uh, 
look at the different phases when 
diaspora is made. So I think up to 
1989 it was purely [telephone 
interruption] So I think it was 
purely two types of diaspora 
people, one which was basically an 
economic, ah, or incentives for 
becoming diaspora were econ-
omic […] or the one would be the 
political asylum seekers, or people 
who left the what was Yugoslavia 
at that time because they were 
seen as a threat or were 
threatened by the regime. These 
two groups were the majority of 
the diaspora for Kosovo, and then 
in 1989 it became a mixture of 
both political and economic 
because of the measures that 
were taken in expelling people 
from jobs and schools that was 
done by the Milosevic regime. So 
that basically these two clear 
divisions became unified in a way 
with the new diaspora, which I 
think it also, because of the 
assumption of the young 
population could potentially 
became part of the military and 
military forces that could fight the 
regime at that time, it was a lot 
more easier for young people to 
get out get a passport and get out 
in Europe but not only. 
 
This historical narrative not only 
constructs binaries between those who 
left for economic reasons and those who 
left as political asylum seekers, but also 
conforms to a linear narrative structure 
implying a continuous process with a 
specific beginning, middle and end.  
 
HA also differentiates the diaspora by 
country of destination, stating that the 
urban educated migrated to the UK, 
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whereas the rural uneducated migrated 
to other parts of Europe:  
 
HA: Also what is, I think 
characteristic for UK diaspora is 
that a lot of urban population 
moved to UK. Which was not the 
case in other parts of Europe, 
which mostly was a rural diaspora, 
people that moved from rural 
areas […]. 
 
Despite a lack of clear official data about 
those who migrated to the UK, the 
assumption that most were educated 
and urban might be explained by the 
absence of guest worker agreements 
between the UK and Yugoslavia (since 
the guest workers or ‘gastarbeiters’ were 
the ones who were rural and 
uneducated). However, as the following 
extract from HA’s interview shows, the 
distinction ‘urban (educated)’-‘rural (un-
educated)’ is also important in terms of 
the value judgments attached to the 
diaspora, especially in terms of their 
perceived contributions to the homeland:  
 
HA: […] you can see the influence 
of the urban diaspora on the 
cultural social life in Kosova when 
they either back for a longer 
period or for a temporary kind of 
interim period of their stay in 
Kosovo. That influence is easily 
seen in music for example, that 
has emerged in during the 
transition in Kosovo, and the 
designs and architecture, that a lot 
of educated UK diaspora tried to 
support development and I think 
you can also see a lot of very 
unique very expert or what do you 
call the, uhm, deficit in terms of 
the human capital that Kosovo 
had. In terms of planning and 
management, which still I guess 
because of other complexities of 
development in Kosovo not 
necessarily has become a main-
stream but you see successful 
individuals, which come back and 
also connect to Kosovo from UK 
diaspora.  
This type of classification of the diaspora 
reveals the perceived social layers 
through which these distinctions are 
embedded and linked to host-country 
place of residence. Specifically, those 
who are from the UK are constructed as 
urban-educated by nearly all the 
interviewees, as another, XHR, states in 
his reflection on Kosovan diaspora 
integration:  
 
XHR: I mean that as far as it 
concerns my perception, in UK in 
London especially, uh, emigrated 
most people from Prishtina mostly. 
While people, uh, people from 
surroundings from villages emig-
rated to Switzerland and Germany 
where they already had a cousin, 
or father or somebody older living. 
But a part of that, I do have a 
feeling that British society and 
policies are more inclusive to 
newcomers. They gave more 
opportunities for the diaspora to 
get included to their life. I don’t 
know schools, work whatever, sort 
of they do not feel neglected or 
like Third World, as they do in 
Germany and Switzerland.  
 
DP: OK, so you think there is more 
discrimination in Germany and 
Switzerland perhaps? 
 
XHR: Exactly 
 
The extract suggests that the UK is 
responsible for producing a more educ-
ated diaspora with the ‘opportunities’ 
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and ‘inclusion’ that are supposed to exist 
in the UK, as opposed to in Germany and 
Switzerland. While emphasising the 
notion that the UK diaspora is more 
educated and likely to become more so, 
the perception that those in Germany 
and Switzerland must be less educated 
and necessarily less integrated in their 
host societies is revealed.  
Similarly, another interviewee, VC, 
suggests that the UK Kosovo Albanian 
Diaspora has integrated well in the UK 
because it is well-educated and urban:  
VC: […] Of course in UK it’s more 
specific because of the quality of 
migration there. Predominantly 
people who left for UK were from 
the cities, from Prishtina or from 
the big cities, and this has had an 
impact on their interaction to 
Kosovo and with our national 
cause so to say. So it is a more 
specific Diaspora, it cannot be 
compared with the one in 
Germany, where we’ve had bigger 
waves of migration that have 
started from seventies, sixties and 
then seventies and eighties. The 
same goes for Switzerland, 
whereas in in UK it’s a more recent 
Diaspora and it’s a Diaspora that 
predominantly comes from the 
cities and from Prishtina. So that 
makes the relationship more 
specific. They are most of them are 
integrated in the societies they live 
in, you don’t see an Albanian street 
in London the way you have a 
Pakistani or a, I dunno, a Chinese 
or, uh ah, you don’t have an 
Albanian quarter in UK, or whereas 
in Germany you, although you 
don’t have a quarter, you have a 
neighbourhoods where the entire 
street is populated by Kosovar 
Albanians.  
In these responses, a historic narrative of 
migration provides the structure through 
which the complexity and diversity of the 
Kosovan Albanian Diaspora is reduced 
and simplified into familiar binary 
categories of urban v rural, educated 
vuneducated, gastarbeiter v political 
exiles and integrated and un-integrated. 
The following section demonstrates how 
this framework of understanding 
diaspora from the homeland provides 
the conditions of possibility for the 
construction of the stereotype ‘schatzi’. 
 
The Schatzi 
 
The use of the word ‘schatzi’ in Kosovo 
originates from a subversion of the 
German word Schatz, which is literally 
translated into English as treasure. The 
word is used in slang German as the 
equivalent of the English words 
sweetheart or darling. As such, in Kosovo 
‘schatzi’ is subverted and used as a 
familiar trope, a rhetorical device, which 
generates meaning in a new subverted 
context. The word ‘schatzi’ relates a very 
specific meaning, intended to signify a 
particular social and economic group in 
the Kosova Diaspora and their 
relationship to homeland. ‘Schatzi’ is 
used alongside the English words of 
endearment, ‘honeys’ and ‘darlings’, as a 
similar trope, having entered the 
Albanian language to describe diaspora 
stereotypically. Following the example of 
‘schatzi’, the terms of endearment 
‘honey’ and ‘darling’ are also subverted in 
their meaning when used by homeland 
Kosovo Albanians to construct and 
‘other’ the diaspora, especially those who 
reside in the UK and US.  
 
As the extracts from the interviews show, 
‘schatzi’ is a well-established stereotype 
used in the language of Kosovo 
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Albanians as a discursive and rhetorical 
device to generate meaning when 
referring to diaspora from continental 
Europe, but more specifically from 
Germany and Switzerland. For example, a 
certain social hierarchy is signified as 
one respondent describes the difference 
in ‘fashion styles’ between what she 
perceives as the ‘diaspora in England’ 
and the ‘diaspora in Germany and 
Switzerland’:  
 
XHR: I might touch upon one of my 
professions, like design, diaspora 
in England is very well, uh how to 
say, uh, has fit very well in the 
English England’s fashion styles, 
while for example diaspora in 
Germany and Switzerland, 
whenever you see them in 
Prishtina or other cities of Kosova 
you immediately know that they 
are schatzis, we call them schatzis 
from Germany and Switzerland 
because they mostly wear white 
things. They can be linen shirts or 
trousers, they are white, from their 
socks and shoes are white. So 
whenever our, uh ah uh… our 
Plaza becomes white, we know 
that it is because of diaspora from 
Germany and Switzerland. 
Although when we talk about 
diaspora in England they have 
much better cultivated taste when 
it comes to dresses, they are 
influenced by best fashion 
designers, they care about their 
quality of life, they enjoy beautiful 
dresses and they care about it. 
They are influenced very much by 
new fashion trends. Which we 
cannot say, at least I cannot say 
about people who live in Germany, 
Switzerland or other European 
countries. 
 
The binary differences between those 
who are diaspora in ‘England’ and 
diaspora in ‘Germany’ here are 
represented as very evident, discursively 
fixed through an appeal to transparency 
(‘you immediately know that they are 
schatzis…’) and to the legitimising force 
of collective cultural practice (‘…we call 
them schatzis from Germany and 
Switzerland…’). As van Dijk notes, such 
expressions of group discourse 
‘expresses not only individual opinions, 
but rather socially shared 
representations’ (1992: 115). Yet there 
was also a reflexive awareness amongst 
respondents about the role of ‘schatzi’ 
discourse in stereotyping sections of the 
diaspora differently: 
 
BL: […] but then you know people 
here have stereotypes about the 
diaspora depending on like where 
they’re coming from, you know, so 
like you have the Schatzis from 
Germany, you have you know, so it 
really depends where you’re 
coming from you know, in terms of 
like what, what kind of stereotype 
in Kosovo you are gonna fit as.  
 
DP: Do they have one for the ones 
that come from the UK? 
 
BL: Definitely, the like the diaspora 
from the UK is considered more 
like a bit more stu- snobby, stuck 
up, you know, but a bit more 
creative, intellectual you know […] 
that’s the stereotype about the 
diaspora from the UK. And that’s 
like referring to the generation that 
left during the 90’s […] but more 
like the early 90’s. Whereas like the 
diaspora from Germany, you know, 
they you they, oh they are just like, 
quote ‘katunar’ you know, like 
‘Schatzis’ and what not, it really 
depends on what country they are 
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coming from, and you know, the 
diaspora from the US, it’s like 
different … kind of like stereotype 
you know so, I think I think that’s 
actually very interesting because 
the people like have mostly 
families… the UK you had, you 
had more like individuals kind of 
like leaving Kosovo, like on an 
individual like basis you know and 
going to the UK, whereas in like 
Germany, you have like huge like 
families like all together, and 
emigrating to like Germany or 
Switzerland you know? (DP: hmm) 
and then in the in the US most of 
the like the moving to the US hap-
happened like during 1999, […] 
also then, that is a different 
generation, because they did 
experience the 90s you know, so 
it’s very interesting to look at what 
point and how these people left 
Kosovo and I think that that is a 
determining like a stereotype for 
those people when they come 
back to Kosovo as well.  
 
BL acknowledges that diaspora 
stereotypes are differentiated by the 
migrant’s country of destination, stating 
that the UK diaspora are considered 
‘snobbish’ and ‘stuck up’, as well as 
‘creative’ and ‘intellectual’. A contrast is 
drawn between the large family groups 
stereotypically associated with migration 
to Germany and Switzerland (corres-
ponding with perceptions about rural 
populations in Kosovo, where larger 
families are assumed to correlate with a 
lack of education), and migration to the 
UK as a more individual venture. Indeed, 
it is perhaps not surprising that an image 
of diaspora more in keeping with 
neoliberal norms for global mobility 
(individualised, educated and profession-
alised) might be expressed with more 
positive connotations. Throughout the 
interviews, issues of power and social 
inequality emerge, especially as 
strategies of positioning one’s 
association with those diaspora who are 
more positively perceived become 
evident. For example, a respondent who 
works in civil society but also as a 
fashion designer suggests that she only 
has a clientele that is intellectual and 
UK-based rather than uneducated and 
Germany-based:  
 
XHR: Lately we had those reunions 
[…] it always depends you know 
what style designer has and with 
what sort of people one works. My 
clients are usually mostly 
intellectuals, and this is why I was 
working lately mostly with those 
coming for school reunions here in 
Kosova. And they usually needed 
improvements in dresses, which 
they already purchased in in 
London.  
 
XHR clearly positions herself with the 
‘intellectual clientele’, but she also 
suggests why the diaspora require her 
services. In stating that the UK diaspora 
come for school reunions, she again 
emphasises education as a 
distinguishing factor, in contrast to those 
who might, for example, need outfits for 
weddings, which are not constructed as 
intellectual events. For the latter, 
religious identity and practice is 
emphasised as a key characteristic: 
 
DP: And what about those from 
other places like in Germany? 
 
XHR: Other places it is usually for 
marriages, because during 
summer in Kosova is marriage 
seasons, this season is changing a 
bit, it is influenced by Ramadan, 
(DP: OK) Ramadan this year starts I 
don’t know whether beginning of 
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July, and that’s why there are not 
too many weddings, they do still 
exist, and that had an impact 
because no one here organises 
weddings without the confirmation 
of their whole family including 
diaspora. So wedding dates are 
usually arranged by vacations or 
free days of those members of the 
family living in diaspora.  
 
By noting that she does not quite know 
when Ramadan begins, XHR distances 
herself from the more religiously 
constructed diaspora from Germany. 
Although XHR relates her direct 
experience working with diaspora, she 
also draws on culturally-shared 
ideologies and a dominant hegemonic 
discourse which represents and 
reaffirms existing social power structures 
valuing professional, intellectual, 
individual practices over traditional, 
cultural, group activities such as 
weddings or religious periods and 
festivities (Van Dijk 1995). 
 
The ‘schatzi’ stereotype appears in such 
accounts to be positioned in relation to 
more positive perception of the UK 
diaspora, further emphasising the 
negative connotations of diaspora in 
Germany and Switzerland. Asked 
specifically about the public image of 
seasonally returning Kosovo Albanians 
from the UK diaspora, XHR asserts: 
 
XHR: It is very personalised, I 
personally do have respect for 
those coming from the UK, 
because I have the feeling, 
because as I said it’s not only for 
fashion, but they are influenced by 
culture and by daily life there. 
While diaspora in, let’s say 
Germany or Switzerland, those are 
most distinguished ones, uh, have 
not changed much especially in 
their mentality. They earned 
money, they are richer much 
richer than they were but their 
quality of life has not changed. I 
sort of have feeling that they are 
not, they have not changed, their 
mentality is the same one, even 
worse their mentality is the same 
as ours was when they left.  
 
The suggestion here that a certain 
entrenched, traditional ‘mentality’, 
impervious to cultural influences, 
functions to mark the distinction 
between rural ‘schatzi’ and others in 
essentialist terms. Whilst the UK 
diaspora’s ‘mentality’ is open and 
amenable to influence ‘by culture and by 
daily life’, the German and Switzerland 
group remains pathologically entrenched 
in pre-migration modes of thought.  
 
It is worth noting that the interviews 
involving officials from the Ministry of 
Diaspora denied the existence of the 
‘schatzi’ stereotype. One junior official’s 
approach was to subvert the ‘schatzi’ 
trope, arguing that since ‘schatzi’ in 
German means treasure, what people 
mean when they call someone a ‘schatzi’ 
is to express an appreciation of their 
value. Furthermore, a more senior official 
narrating his own migration to 
Switzerland during the 1980s noted how, 
despite having lived previously in a rural 
area of Kosovo, he was a political exile, 
returning to Kosovo after the war to work 
in the Kosovo government. Drawing upon 
personal experience to offer an 
oppositional narrative that clearly 
contradicts the ‘schatzi’ stereotype, 
represents an important strategy of 
resistance, but one which remains 
vulnerable to dismissal as an exception 
to the rule, and which does not subvert 
the structure of dominance so devaluing 
the identity of guest workers labelled as 
‘schatzi’.  
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Cash cows 
 
Money is strongly associated with the 
Kosovo Albanian Diaspora, and diaspora 
remittances continue to be a key 
resource (FID 2009; USAID 2010; UNDP 
2012; Xharra and Waehlisch 2012; KAS 
2013). It is estimated that the diaspora 
infuses the Kosovan economy with 
somewhere around 500 million euro 
each year. This was a strong theme in 
the interview responses, and as one 
interviewee stated, ‘Over and over again, 
they are seen as cash-cows’: 
 
HA: I think this connects with what 
I was just saying. I think that the 
fact that diaspora has been 
supporting mostly their families 
and making at one point even one 
third of the budget of Kosovo, in a 
way their identity became money, 
we identified them and we feel and 
lived with them through money the 
relationship of the money, and I 
think that there is a lot of humour 
that has come out of the idea or 
the ana – analysing the relation-
ship between people from the 
diaspora and here. So schatzi in 
my sense, is that in a short way 
this explains ‘we love your money 
but we don’t like the way you 
behave in in the society’. Which 
means there is a huge gap 
between people who live in 
diaspora and people who live in 
here. There is a subconscious idea 
that everyone that receives the 
money in Kosovo knows that is 
wrong and that immediately 
translates into some kind of 
rejection of identifying them as 
schatzi that ultimately makes them 
lower in rank than people who 
actually receive their money. So it’s 
a huge disparity of relationships 
that has been built individually and 
then as a collective versus 
Kosovars who live in here, so it’s a 
very very complex I would say 
relationship that everyone tries to 
avoid the debate therefore you 
exclude them by identifying them 
with some with a term that literally 
puts them as less. I don’t think it’s 
a class issue, it’s a more ident 
labelling them with something that 
makes them less equal with 
Kosovars, even though they are the 
source of funding and the money 
for families and society. 
Another interviewee, SB, who was only 
seventeen when she came to the UK in 
1990 as an au pair, elaborates the issue 
of sending money home from the 
position of the migrant, ‘I was the only 
person from my family to leave Kosova 
and due to the Milosevic regime which 
dismissed all Albanians from state 
institutions, I was the only member of my 
family to have an income and support 
my parents and siblings back home’.  
 
In fact, even the government is trying to 
obtain more money from the diaspora, 
by charging those coming from the 
diaspora with western number plates 
more money to enter Kosovo. 
Nonetheless, recently there has been 
opposition to the treatment of the 
diaspora by the government of Kosovo. 
The opposition party Self-Determination 
or Vetvendosja expressed concern about 
the application of additional border fines 
that were being enforced and charged to 
‘compatriots from Diaspora’. In a press 
release from May 2011, they criticised 
the government for ‘looting’ the Diaspora 
Kosovo Albanians:  
 
After many letters and e-mails that 
we receive from compatriots in the 
Diaspora, VETËVENDOSJA! has 
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made an analysis of the policy 
issues that impose charges on 
foreign-registered vehicles entering 
Kosovo. As a result, each migrant 
who comes to vacation in Kosovo, 
pays twice for vehicle insurance, 
once in the country of origin and 
the other for the duration of their 
stay in Kosovo. (My translation) 
 
Furthermore, according to Vetvendosja 
‘from the millions "looted" from our 
diaspora, only 10% is used ‘for the 
payment of damages’ that the diaspora 
supposedly cause to the roads in Kosovo 
when they come for holidays during the 
summer months. The rest goes through 
to other budgets that are divided by the 
government at their discretion’. However, 
it appears that as Kosovo attempts to 
establish itself as a new self-reliant state, 
this economic relationship with the 
diaspora is changing, as KG states:  
 
KG: So now how do we as 
Kosovars feel about them, well I 
think that we are in the process of 
getting detached from our 
dependency of diaspora which was 
basically created during the 
nineties where many sort of 
households had remittances as 
their only income of survival. Now 
we are entering a different phase 
where basically it’s, uh, it’s more 
like things are getting things are 
changing […]. 
 
However, a more complex discourse 
emerges when the issues of the 
returning diaspora is addressed. Because 
the UK diaspora is positioned as well-
educated and intellectual, there seem to 
be two lines of thought. One suggests 
that the UK diaspora is so well integrated 
in the UK that they would not return, and 
the other, that if they were to return, 
some anticipate them making a positive 
contribution, whereas others suggest 
that they would take highly-paid jobs as 
‘internationals’ because they possess 
British passports. Thus, as the two 
extracts below show, the anxieties 
surrounding the return of the ‘schatzi’ 
vary significantly between countries of 
destination: 
 
DP: Do you think that sometimes 
there is potential to view the UK 
diaspora because of what you 
have said their trendiness with 
fashion, their intellectualism, their 
cultural, their high cultural tastes, 
do you think they are seen as a 
little bit of a threat, as opposed to 
what you’ve described as the 
‘Schatzis’ in Germany? You know 
do they seem like competition? 
 
XHR: No not at all, firstly because 
there is a common feeling that 
they do not plan to come back, 
they do not have reasons to plan 
to come, they are living a nice 
unstressful, not unstressful but less 
stressful life than we are, so while 
we have a feeling like when we 
when we talk with and about 
diaspora in Germany in 
Switzerland the feeling like we are 
still dealing with katunars, that 
feeling does not exists about and 
with Albanians in England. 
 
Perhaps the anxiety around the UK 
diaspora is lessened by a perception that 
those in the UK do not intend to move 
back to Kosovo, as VC states: 
 
VC: So in UK it’s more specific, what 
we have seen in UK is people who 
have gone there to live and not to 
live and come back. I mean this is, I 
believe, the biggest difference 
between the Diaspora in UK and 
Diaspora.  
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Nonetheless, when those UK diaspora do 
return, and perhaps due to the 
perception of the UK diaspora as ‘well-
educated’ and ‘cultured’ there is an 
anxiety that they return to work for 
international missions which are highly 
paid, thus putting the locals at a 
disadvantage. As the following quote 
from VC shows:  
VC: They come for jobs, but they 
work here, most of them work here 
as British citizens, they work with 
international organisations OSCE, 
EULEX, before UNMIK. So most of 
them have come back as Brits, 
and they have the British passport, 
they keep the British citizenship, 
they get very good salaries. But not 
many have come back to work for 
local salaries and local institutions, 
there are of course very few 
exceptions, but this was not the 
predominant trend and, there is 
nothing wrong with it, absolutely 
not. 
 
Conclusion 
 
‘Schatzi’ is not just a word, but a 
linguistic trope, embedded discursively 
and ideologically in the homeland 
culture of Kosova. It functions as a 
stereotype to construct and ‘other’ the 
Kosovo Albanian Diaspora, especially in 
Germany and Switzerland. In the 
language and descriptions of the 
‘schatzi’, interviewees state that on the 
one hand, the ‘schatzi’ have worked hard 
in host countries and have earned good 
incomes and accumulated wealth that 
has played an important role in the form 
of remittances. However, on the other 
hand, this ‘cash cow’ element of the 
‘schatzi’ discourse has not necessarily 
translated into positive social status for 
the diaspora. Whilst the UK-based 
diaspora are often attributed with a 
cultural sophistication and ‘mentality’ 
that is linked with a framework of 
understanding that accepts their 
integration overseas and role in the 
‘international’ labour market when 
returning to Kosova, the ‘schatzi’ more 
generally are represented as lacking 
cultural advancement and social capital, 
failing to climb the social ladder in their 
western host countries.  
 
Through analysis of interview data, I have 
argued that the meaning of diaspora is 
not merely dependent upon how a 
migrant community closely identifies 
with an imagined homeland. To 
understand diaspora’s complexities also 
requires focus on the imagined diaspora 
and its relationship(s) with the imagined 
homeland/host-land. Stuart Hall (2007), 
states that the dominant western 
discourses, which described and 
differentiated between Europe and 
others, used European cultural 
categories, languages and ideas to 
represent the ‘other’. As my analyses 
demonstrate, these dominant ‘othering’ 
discourses are also present in the 
discourses of Kosovo Albanians in 
Kosovo who represent, categorise and 
differentiate their diaspora. The inherent 
heterogeneity and hybridity of diaspora 
are not captured in ‘schatzi’ discourse, 
but instead, rather broad generalisations 
depending on factors such as time of 
migration, place of migration and 
emigration and socio-economic factors, 
are applied to classify and explain the 
differences internal to the ‘schatzi’ 
stereotype. Thus the diaspora is 
imagined and actively constructed as 
‘schatzi’ in the Kosovan Albanian 
homeland, but not as a homogenous 
entity, or, necessarily, entirely 
consistently.  
 
	  
	  
15	  
	  www.cf.ac.uk/JOMECjournal  @JOMECjournal	  
 
 
References 
Abrahams, F. (2001), Under Orders, New York: Human Rights Watch. 
Allcock, J. (2002), ‘Rural-urban differences and the break-up of Yugoslavia’, Balkanologie: Revue 
d'etudes pluridisciplinaires, 6(1-2), 101-125. 
Anthias, F. and Lloyd, C. (2001), Rethinking Anti-Racisms, Hoboken: Routledge.  
Anthias, F. (1998), ‘Evaluating Diaspora’, Sociology 32: 557-580, 
Batovic, A. (2009), 'The Soviet Union And The June 1967 Six Day War', Cold War History 9.4: 529-
530.  
Bernard, S. (2012), 'Developing The Yugoslav Gastarbeiter Reintegration Policy. Political And 
Economic Aspects (1969-1974)', South East European Studies 5. 
Bieber, F. and Daskalovski, Z. (2003), Understanding the war in Kosovo: 1st ed, London: Frank 
Cass. 
Blumi, I. (2002), ‘A Story of Mitigated Ambitions: Kosova's Torturous Path to its Postwar Future’, 
Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International relations, [online] 1(4), Available at: 
http://www.alternativesjournal.net/volume1/number4/blumi.htm [Accessed 9 Aug. 2014]. 
Booth, K. (2012), The Kosovo Tragedy, Hoboken: Taylor and Francis. 
Brah, A. (1996), Cartographies Of Diaspora, London: Routledge. 
Braziel, J. E. and Mannur, A. (2003), Theorizing Diaspora. Malden, MA: Blackwell.  
Clifford, J. (1994), 'Diasporas', Cultural Anthropology, 9.3: 302-338. 
Cohen, R. (2001), Global Diasporas, London: Routledge.  
Das Gupta, T. (2007), Race And Racialization, Toronto: Canadian Scholars' Press.  
Derrida, J. (1983), ‘Homi Bhabha: the Other Question’, Screen, 24, 18-36. 
Van Dijk, T/ A. (1995), 'Discourse, Opinions And Ideologies’ Current Issues In Language and 
Society, 2.2, 115-145.  
Van Dijk, T. A. (1992), Text And Context. London: Longman.  
European Commission (2012), Social Impact of Emigration and Rural - Urban Migration in Central 
and Eastern Europe, Kosovo: European Commission. 
	  
	  
16	  
	  www.cf.ac.uk/JOMECjournal  @JOMECjournal	  
Fairclough, N. (1989). Language and Power, London: Longman. 
Fairclough, N. (1995), Critical Discourse Analysis, London: Longman.  
Fanon, F. (1967) A Dying Colonialism, New York: Grove Press.  
FID (Forum for Democratic Initiative) (2009), Diaspora as a driving force for development in 
Kosovo: Myth or Reality?, FID. 
Forum 2015 (2007), Diaspora and Migration Policies, Prishtina: Forum 2015. 
Hall, S. (1990), Culture, Media, Language, London: U. Hyman.  
Hall, S. and Du Gay, P. (1996), Questions Of Cultural Identity, London: Sage.  
Hall, S., Morley, D. and Chen, K-H. (1996), Stuart Hall, London: Routledge.  
Jaworski, A. and Coupland, N. (1999), The Discourse Reader, London: Routledge.  
Jorgensen, M. and Phillips, L. (2002), Discourse Analysis As Theory And Method, London: Sage 
Publications.  
Kostovicova, D. and Prestreshi, A. (2003), ‘Education, gender and religion: identity transformations 
of Kosovo Albanians in London’, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 29(6),1079-1096. 
Levitt, P. and Glick Schiller, N. (2004), 'Conceptualizing Simultaneity: A Transnational Social Field 
Perspective On Society', International Migration Review 38.3: 1002-1039.  
Malcolm, N. (1998), Kosovo, New York: New York University Press. 
Safran, W. (1991) 'Diasporas In Modern Societies: Myths Of Homeland And Return', Diaspora 1.1: 
83-99.  
Seidman, I. (2006), Interviewing As Qualitative Research, New York: Teachers College Press.  
Sofos, S. (1996), ‘Interethnic Violence and Gendered Constructions of Ethnicity in former 
Yugoslavia’, Social Identities, 2(1): 73-91. 
Sokefeld, M. (2006), 'Mobilizing In Transnational Space: A Social Movement Approach To The 
Formation Of Diaspora', Global Networks 6.3: 265-284.  
Tatum, D. C. (2010), Genocide At The Dawn Of The Twenty-First Century, New York, NY: Palgrave 
Macmillan. 
Tsagarousianou, R. (2004), ‘Rethinking the Concept of Daspora: Mobility, Connectivity and 
Communication in a Globalised World’, Westminster Papers in Communication and Culture 
1.1: 52-65.  
Vathi, Z. and King, R. (2013) ‘“Have you got the Britísh?”: narratives of migration and settlement 
among Albanian-origin immigrants in London’ Ethnic and Racial Studies, 36.11: 1829-1848. 
	  
	  
17	  
	  www.cf.ac.uk/JOMECjournal  @JOMECjournal	  
Vertovec, S. and Cohen, R. (1999), Migration, Diasporas, And Transnationalism, Cheltenham, UK: 
Edward Elgar.  
Vertovec, S. (1999), Migration And Social Cohesion, Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Pub.  
Vetevendosja (n.d.), Press Release, May 2011, [online] Available at: 
http://www.vetevendosje.org/news_post/diaspora/ [Accessed 4 Aug. 2014] 
Weedon, C. (1987), Feminist Practice And Poststructuralist Theory, Oxford, UK: B. Blackwell. 
Wodak, R. and Meyer, M. (2009), Methods Of Critical Discourse Analysis. Los Angeles: SAGE.  
Wodak, R. (1997), Gender And Discourse, London: Sage Publications.  
Wodak, R. (2009), The Discursive Construction Of National Identity. Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press.  
World Bank (2011), Migration and Economic Development in Kosovo, World Bank. 
Xharra, B. and Waehlisch, M. (2012), Beyond Remittances: Public Diplomacy and Kosovo's 
Diaspora, [online] Available at: 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2108317 [Accessed 15 Aug. 2014] 
This article was first published in JOMEC Journal 
JOMEC Journal is an online, open-access and peer reviewed journal dedicated to publishing the 
highest quality innovative academic work in Journalism, Media and Cultural Studies. It is published 
by Cardiff University Press and run by an editorial collective based in the School of 
Journalism, Media and Cultural Studies at Cardiff University, committed both to open-access 
publication and to maintaining the highest standards of rigour and academic integrity. JOMEC 
Journal is peer reviewed with an international, multi-disciplinary Editorial Board and Advisory 
Panel. It welcomes work that is located in any one of these disciplines, as well as 
interdisciplinary work that approaches Journalism, Media and Cultural Studies as overlapping 
and interlocking fields. It is particularly interested in work that addresses the political and 
ethical dimensions, stakes, problematics and possibilities of Journalism, Media and Cultural 
Studies. 
To submit a paper or to discuss publication, please contact: 
Dr Paul Bowman: BowmanP@cf.ac.uk 
www.cf.ac.uk/jomecjournal 
Twitter: @JOMECjournal 
ISSN: ISSN 2049-2340 
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Unported 
License. Based on a work at www.cf.ac.uk/jomecjournal. 
cardiffuniversitypress.org
